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Abstract
We consider the effect of carbon subsidies and taxes, in the form of carbon credit alloca-
tions, on forest owners’ land use and harvest decisions. We introduce three possible credit
allocation regimes: one where credits are allocated according to the annual flow of carbon,
another where annual credits are proportional to the stock of carbon, and a third involving
lump sum payments. Using a real options model with uncertain future timber prices, we
examine the effect on the timing of harvest, the replanting-abandonment decision, and the
value of a forest. We show that forests are less likely to be converted to alternative land
uses under all three regimes, relative to the situation without any carbon credit allocation.
We also show that the flows and stocks schemes lengthen optimal rotations, while lump sum
allocations shorten them. Thus, the objectives of reduced deforestation and longer rotations
are best met by the flows and stocks schemes. Our numerical experiments suggest that these
two regimes yield very similar outcomes.
JEL classification: Q23, Q28, Q15
Keywords: Optimal forest rotation length, real options, carbon credits
1 Introduction
Carbon dioxide is widely believed to be one of the main greenhouse gases contributing to climate
change, and governments throughout the world are actively considering ways of reducing car-
bon dioxide emissions. Forestry experts with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) suggest that trees, which remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and store it as
carbon, have the potential to sequester significant amounts of carbon. However, in the absence
of carbon subsidies or taxes, forest owners consider only the cash flows from harvesting and sell-
ing timber when managing their forests. It is likely, therefore, that current forestry management
practices are not optimal when the public good benefits of carbon sequestration are considered.
This paper examines the ability of carbon subsidies and taxes to incentivize forest owners to
increase forest land and lengthen rotations, both steps which will increase overall carbon storage
and help mitigate climate change.
∗We thank Lewis Evans for many very helpful comments. Kevin Counsell, Steen Videbeck, and participants
at an ISCR seminar also provided useful comments. Fletcher Forests Ltd and the New Zealand Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry generously provided data.
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The Kyoto Protocol is one attempt by the world community to reduce the emission of
greenhouse gases. Under the Protocol, forest sinks would earn tradable emission units, so-called
carbon credits, in exchange for sequestering carbon, thus providing an incentive to enhance such
sinks. Governments may allocate these credits to domestic forest owners or retain them as they
see fit, but distribution of carbon credits to forest owners will be necessary if there are to be
any incentive effects. We examine this issue in this paper, focussing on alternative carbon credit
payment systems that governments may use to allocate credits to growers.
A thorough analysis of the problem needs to allow for alternative land uses, because one of
the key goals of distributing carbon credits is to deter forest owners from switching to alternative
land uses. Since one of the key determinants of such a change, as well as of the timing of harvest
decisions, is the level of timber prices, we must also allow for volatility in future timber prices.
Thus, we follow the so-called ‘real options’ approach to modelling optimal harvesting decisions.
(See, for example, Morck, et al. (1989) and Insley (2002).) An important insight of the real
options approach is that when decisions are costly to reverse and made under uncertainty,
there is a value in delaying decisions. Options, such as that to harvest a forest, will only be
exercised when the payoff from doing so exceeds the value of waiting. Thus, a forest will not be
harvested as soon as doing so is a break-even action. Rather, the forest owner will wait, gathering
more information about future timber prices, before committing to the harvest decision — and,
perhaps more importantly, before deciding whether to replant the land or switch to an alternative
use. When uncertainty is greater, the forest owner will delay longer.
We consider three different schemes for allocating carbon credits to forest owners. In the
simplest regime, forest owners receive a lump sum payment whenever they plant a forest, and
must repay the same lump sum as soon as the forest is harvested. (If a forest is replanted
immediately after harvesting, the net payment is zero). The other two regimes allocate carbon
credits in proportion to the change in the forest’s carbon stock, called the flows scheme, and
to the level of the carbon stock, called the stocks scheme, respectively. Thus, under the flows
scheme the forest owner must repay the carbon credits accumulated during the life of the forest
as soon as it is harvested. The forest owner is not liable to any such repayment under the stocks
scheme.
The forest owner has a strong incentive not to switch to an alternative land use under the
lump sum scheme, and by making the outside option less attractive this scheme lowers the
value of delaying the harvest decision, therefore leading to shorter rotations than should be the
case without carbon credits. Thus, while a lump sum scheme would discourage deforestation,
it would encourage more rapid rotations, implying an ambiguous result for overall carbon se-
questration. Despite the differences between the flows and stocks schemes, we find that they
induce remarkably similar behavior from forest owners. The increased value of the forest re-
sulting from the carbon credit cash flows discourages forest owners from exiting the industry.
However, replanting is actually delayed under these regimes, despite the reduced value of waiting
to determine the optimal future land use. This occurs because harvesting a forest would result
in the relatively high carbon credit cash flows earned by a mature forest being replaced by the
much lower carbon credit cash flows earned by a newly-planted one. Thus, the flows and stocks
schemes both discourage deforestation and encourage longer rotations, both leading to enhanced
carbon sequestration.
Other authors have considered the interaction between carbon sequestration and optimal
rotation length. Van Kooten, et al. (1995) use a deterministic model of a forest which is always
replanted upon harvesting to study the socially-optimal rotation length under different assump-
tions regarding carbon value, the amount of carbon released upon harvesting, etc. Romero, et
al. (1998) approach the problem from a social planner’s point of view and, using a deterministic
model, examine the trade-off between the value of harvested timber and the value of carbon
uptake for a particular family of social welfare functions. They calculate subsidies which induce
forest owners to choose socially-optimal rotation lengths. Sohngen and Mendelsohn (2003) de-
scribe a deterministic general equilibrium model, and use it to derive endogenous time paths
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for the price of carbon and the price of timber. However, all of these authors use deterministic
models and, with the exception of Sohngen and Mendelsohn, ignore the possibility of changing
land use which is so important under any carbon credit regime.
In the next section we describe the carbon credit allocation schemes which we will consider
in this paper. We describe our model in Section 3, and calibrate it to New Zealand data in
Section 4. The optimal forest management policy is analyzed in Section 5. The next section
discusses the implications of our findings for policymakers, and Section 7 offers some concluding
remarks.
2 Three alternative payment systems
Under the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1997), credits earned for sequestering carbon dioxide
would be allocated to the governments that have ratified the international treaty. Forest sinks
may also be the point of obligation for the release of emissions relating to harvest known as Kyoto
obligations. The governments may allocate these credits and Kyoto obligations to domestic forest
owners or retain them as they see fit. Since there is still much uncertainty over the mechanics of
how credits will be allocated to growers, in this section we introduce three alternative schemes for
allocating credits, and discuss the merits of each. We assume throughout that the government
is willing to pass on both carbon credits and Kyoto obligations to growers.
Lump sum regime. Afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation are infrequent and costly-
to-reverse events that greatly alter the carbon density of a unit of land.1 The Kyoto Protocol,
which is concerned with land-use change, rewards afforestation and reforestation and penalizes
deforestation when allocating credits to the Parties. The lump sum regime is a means by which
carbon credit allocations to forest owners can mirror allocations to the Parties and reflect these
one-off changes to the carbon landscape. It entitles forest owners to a one-off lump sum payment
for engaging in afforestation or reforestation, paid at the commencement of the first rotation.
Growers retain these credits as long as replanting occurs immediately after harvest; if the forest
is not replanted, deforestation has occurred, the owner incurs a Kyoto obligation, and the lump
sum allocation must be repaid in full.
Flows regime. Under this scheme, which is the one modelled by van Kooten, et al. (1995),
the carbon credit cash flows are a function of the annual change in the forest carbon stock.
Credit payments reflect the flow of carbon between land and the atmosphere via the carbon
cycle, so a net increase in the carbon stock over a year means the sink has removed carbon from
the atmosphere and the owner is paid credits for the carbon. Similarly, a fall in the carbon
stock suggests carbon has been released into the atmosphere, and the owner surrenders the
associated credits. Therefore, the forest attracts credits as long as it is growing. The moment it
is harvested, it is assumed that all the sequestered carbon is released back into the atmosphere
so the owner incurs a Kyoto obligation and all the credits earned throughout the life of the
forest must be repaid.2 Upon replanting, the owner starts to re-accumulate credits. If the owner
1Afforestation is “the direct human-induced conversion of land that has not been forested for a period of at
least 50 years to forested land through planting, seeding, and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed
sources”, reforestation is “the direct human-induced conversion of non-forested land to forested land through
planting, seeding, and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources, on land that was forested but
that has been converted to non-forested land”, and deforestation is “the direct human-induced conversion of
forested land to non-forested land” (UNFCCC, 2001).
2In practice, harvest does not result in the total removal of all biomass. Some above-ground biomass (ground
litter, fallen branches), as well as some below-ground biomass (semi-decomposed litter, roots) will remain behind
even after the removal of the trees. Over time this matter will break down completely but as this occurs more will
accumulate from subsequent rotations maintaining a roughly stable minimum carbon stock on the land. However
for simplicity, and in keeping with IPCC assumptions that the biomass from the forest breaks down immediately
after harvest, we assume that the carbon stock on the land goes to zero upon harvest.
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decides not to replant, then the credits have been surrendered forever.
Stocks regime. Forest sinks remove carbon from the atmosphere during periods of growth,
but eventually release carbon back into the atmosphere following harvest, hence providing only
temporary benefits. Nevertheless, even temporary carbon capture generates a positive environ-
mental externality during the period of storage. The stocks scheme, which is the one modelled by
Sohngen and Mendelsohn (2003), rewards this temporary storage by giving forest owners credit
not only for the quantity of carbon captured, but also for the duration of capture, effectively
treating carbon credits as rent payments for the storage of carbon. Under this regime, credits
are allocated to the owner annually in proportion to the size of the total carbon stock, which
grows cumulatively through time. As long as carbon is being held the forest receives rent in the
form of carbon credits.3
3 The model
In this paper we value a representative forest receiving carbon credit payments, allowing us to
examine the effect of these payments on the optimal behavior of forest owners. When the forest
is t years old, the volume of timber (per hectare) equals V (t), for some (deterministic) function
V . We assume the price of timber, P , evolves according to the Itoˆ process
dP = µ(P )dt+ σP dz, (1)
where µ(P ) is a general drift term that is a function of timber prices, σ is a positive constant,
and z is a Wiener process. We also assume that timber stocks have a convenience yield κP , for
some constant κ, so that the ‘risk-neutral’ process for the price of timber is4
dP = (r − κ)Pdt+ σP dz, (2)
where r is the riskless interest rate. Over each increment of time, dt, the owner of a forest
which is t years old receives an after-tax cash flow of ψ(t)dt, comprising carbon credit revenues
(calculated according to one of the three regimes introduced in Section 2) less non-harvest related
costs.5 The appropriate values for the carbon credit cash flows under each of the three schemes,
denoted by Q(t), are summarized in Table 1.
At each point in time, the forest owner must take one of three possible actions: decide to
harvest the forest and convert the land to some alternative use; decide to harvest the forest and
replant the land; or delay the harvest decision. The value of a forest which is t years old is
F (P, t) = max{piat , pi
r
t , pi
d
t },
where piat , pi
r
t , and pi
d
t denote the respective payoffs to abandoning, replanting, and delaying.
Since the owner requires a lead-time of T years in order to mobilize for harvest, the decision
to harvest is always made T years in advance. When this decision is made, fixed (after-tax)
pre-harvest costs δ are immediately incurred. The abandonment payoff is therefore6
piat = −δ +
∫ T
0
e−rsψ(t+ s)ds+ e−rTE
[
(1− Tc)
(
Pt+T − h
)
V (t+ T ) + Qˆ(t+ T ) + S
]
, (3)
3The absence of Kyoto obligations under this regime makes it an ideal means to allocate credits by the Clean
Development Mechanism to non-Annex I countries, who face no obligations under the Protocol and therefore
cannot be penalized for harvest-related emissions.
4For a detailed discussion of the role that ‘risk-neutral’ processes play in valuation, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994,
Chapter 4).
5In practice these cash flows arise discretely through time (annually or as one-off amounts), but as we value
the forest in continuous time we assume a continuous cash flow stream. See Appendix A for a summary of the
forest’s cash outflows.
6The expected value in this expression is calculated using the ‘risk-neutral’ process for the price of timber,
ensuring that forest values are arbitrage-free. The same is true of all other expected values in this paper.
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Table 1: Carbon credit cash flows under the three schemes
Regime Q(t) Qˆ(t)
Lump sum
{
xl if t = 0,
0 if t > 0.
−xl
Flows xfV ′(t) −xf (V (t)− V (0))
Stocks xsV (t) 0
Notes: The entries in the table describe the carbon credit regimes introduced in Section 2. The
precise levels of the cash flows depend on regime-specific constant parameters xl, xf , and xs, reflect-
ing the quantity of credits allocated and the price of carbon credits (assumed constant over time).
The column labelled Q(t) shows the carbon credit cash flow received by the owner of a t-year old
forest while it is growing, and the column labelled Qˆ(t) shows the carbon credit cash flow when the
corresponding forest is harvested.
where Tc is the corporate tax rate, h represents harvest costs (per unit of timber), V (t + T ) is
the volume of timber extracted at the harvest date, Qˆ(t+ T¯ ) denotes the after-tax carbon credit
cash flows when harvest occurs (specified in Table 1), and S is some fixed scrap value received
by the owner in the event that forestry is abandoned in favor of an alternative land-use. The
first term in (3) represents the costs incurred at the time the harvesting decision is made, the
second (integral) term gives the value of all cash flows received until harvest occurs, and the
third term is the present value of the harvest-date cash flows. The payoff from harvesting, and
then replanting, the forest is similar, with the scrap value S being replaced by the value of a
newly-planted forest:
pirt = −δ +
∫ T
0
e−rsψ(t+ s)ds (4)
+ e−rTE
[
(1− Tc)
(
Pt+T − h
)
V (t+ T ) + Qˆ(t+ T ) + F (Pt+T , 0)
]
.
Finally, if harvest does not occur during the next short interval of length dt, then the payoff is
pidt = ψ(t)dt+ e
−r dtE[F (P + dP, t+ dt)],
comprising the sum of the cash flow received during this interval and the present value of the
(unharvested) forest at the end of the interval. Using Itoˆ’s Lemma, this equals
pidt = ψ(t)dt+ F (P, t) +
(
∂F
∂t
+
1
2
σ2P 2
∂2F
∂P 2
+ (r − κ)P
∂F
∂P
− rF
)
dt.
In the region where delay is optimal, F (P, t) = pidt , so that F must satisfy the partial differential
equation
0 =
∂F
∂t
+
1
2
σ2P 2
∂2F
∂P 2
+ (r − κ)P
∂F
∂P
− rF + ψ(t). (5)
The optimal harvest policy is described by two thresholds, P a(t) and P r(t), which are func-
tions of the age of the forest. If the timber price is less than P a(t) when an established forest is t
years old, then the forest owner should immediately begin the harvest process and, when harvest
is complete, convert the land to an alternative land use; if the timber price exceeds P r(t) when
an established forest is t years old, then the forest owner should immediately begin the harvest
process and, when harvest is complete, replant trees on the land; if the timber price lies between
these thresholds, then the forest owner should delay the harvest decision. Thus F equals piat
when P ≤ P a(t), it equals pirt when P ≥ P
r(t), and it satisfies (5) when P a(t) < P < P r(t).
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Table 2: Discrete-time estimates of price process
αˆ βˆ φˆ
0.83 0.83 0.10
(0.25) (0.05)
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the process in (7), with standard errors given in paren-
theses. φˆ is the standard error of the regression.
Table 3: Parameter summary
Parameter Value Parameter Value
aˆ 0.73 γˆ3 −0.01512
bˆ 4.97 r 0.05
σˆ 0.25 κ 0.075
γˆ1 −2.676 Tc 0.33
γˆ2 1.224 S 1087.15
Notes: aˆ, bˆ, and σˆ are our estimates of the parameters appearing in (6), the timber price process.
γˆ1, γˆ1, and γˆ1 determine the process (8) which describes the volume of timber in the forest. r is the
continuously-compounded riskless interest rate, κ is the convenience yield, Tc is the corporate tax
rate, and S is the value of the land (in dollars per hectare) in its next most valuable use.
4 Calibration of model parameters
The historical timber price data used in this paper consists of quarterly observations on New
Zealand A-Grade Pinus radiata logs (1973:1–2001:3). All prices are measured in New Zealand
dollars per Japanese Agricultural Standard cubic meter, priced free-on-board, and are adjusted
from nominal to real December 1999 levels. Making a common assumption for commodity prices,
and consistent with the process in (1), we assume that the natural logarithm of timber prices,
p = logP , evolves according to the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
dp = a(b− p)dt+ σdz, (6)
where a is the rate of mean-reversion and b is the long-run level of logP . This process may be
modelled in discrete-time using the AR(1) process
pt = α+ βpt−1 + ut, ut ∼ N(0, φ
2). (7)
The OLS estimates of (7) are presented in Table 2. From these estimates, it is possible to
estimate the parameters in (6) via
aˆ =
− log βˆ
∆t
, bˆ =
αˆ
1− βˆ
, σˆ = φˆ
√
−2 log βˆ
(1− βˆ2)∆t
,
where ∆t = 1/4.7 These estimates are reported in Table 3.
The wood volume data used in this paper was generated using the forestry software pack-
age STANDPAK developed by the New Zealand Forest Research Institute (Whiteside, 1990).
STANDPAK was used to simulate the volume of wood in a representative single-hectare Pinus
radiata forest with a site index of 29 meters.8 We use OLS to fit the simple cubic function
V (t) = γ1t+ γ2t
2 + γ3t
3 (8)
7See, for instance, Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Chapter 3).
8The site index is the mean top height at age 20 of all trees in a stand, and is used as a measure of the
productivity of a unit of land.
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Figure 1: Optimal forest management
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Notes: This figure represents the replanting and abandonment decision thresholds for the owner of
a representative P. radiata forest who faces uncertainty in timber prices. Within the lightly shaded
region it is optimal to harvest and then immediately replant. Within the darkly shaded region it
is optimal to harvest and then abandon. In the clear region it is optimal to defer harvest. At any
point in time, P r is the minimum price that would induce replanting and P a is the maximum price
that would induce abandonment. P ∗ is the trigger price required to persuade the owner to switch
from a replanting to an abandonment decision.
to the wood flow data. The parameter estimates are presented in Table 3.
The project scrap value, S, is the average freehold farm sale price per hectare of grazing
farmland in New Zealand for 2001 deflated to real December 1999 levels.9 This price is market-
determined, and so captures the value to forest owners of switching to an alternative land-use.
All the model parameters relevant to the numerical implementation of our model are summarized
in Table 3.
In the absence of a closed-form solution to the option pricing problem, we numerically ap-
proximate a solution using the method described in Appendix B.
5 Optimal forest management
Figure 1 shows the replanting and abandonment thresholds for the owner of a representative
plantation of Pinus radiata for the parameters specified above. Forest age is represented on the
horizontal axis while the price of timber is represented on the vertical one. It is optimal to delay
the harvest decision as long as the timber price path, which evolves through time according
to (1), remains in the clear region in between the two thresholds. However, whenever the price
path crosses either threshold, the owner should initiate the harvest process. The lightly shaded
area shows where it is optimal to harvest and then immediately replant the land. The darkly
shaded area shows where it is optimal to harvest and abandon forestry by converting to an
alternative land-use.
The forest owner should optimally delay harvest in some situations, even when harvesting
and then replanting the land (or harvesting and then converting to an alternative land use) would
have a positive payoff, and our results include this behavior. The reason why such behavior can
be optimal is that there is a value in waiting to gather more information. Both replanting the
land and converting it to an alternative use incur sunk costs, and decision-makers wish to avoid
having to reverse decisions which incur such costs. For example, forest owners want to avoid
9Source: New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2002, Table 17, p. 106.
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Table 4: Carbon credits and management of a representative P. radiata forest
x P a P r P ∗ F (P ; 0) F (P ; 10) F (P ; 20) FW (P ; 0) FQ(P ; 0)
Lump sum scheme
0 60 155 100 3427.73 12201.79 27549.03 3427.73 0.00
500 55 150 95 3754.62 11988.93 27366.04 3423.26 331.36
1000 50 145 90 4089.82 11785.76 27200.54 3409.56 680.26
1500 40 140 80 4433.83 11592.96 27046.13 3388.67 1045.16
Flows scheme
0 60 155 100 3427.73 12201.79 27549.03 3427.73 0.00
1.5 55 160 100 3497.15 12210.74 27171.02 3426.30 70.85
3.0 50 160 95 3569.53 12224.35 26797.88 3421.54 147.99
4.5 40 165 95 3651.53 12249.66 26434.70 3296.96 354.58
Stocks scheme
0 60 155 100 3427.73 12201.79 27549.03 3427.73 0.00
0.075 55 160 100 3497.21 12331.57 27643.89 3426.31 70.90
0.150 50 160 95 3569.64 12466.01 27743.61 3421.54 148.10
0.225 40 165 95 3651.68 12612.14 27853.29 3297.08 354.60
Notes: For each of the indicated carbon credit allocation regimes, columns 2–4 of the table summa-
rize the optimal forest management policy, with P a and P r giving the abandonment and replanting
thresholds, respectively, for a forest that is 20 years old. P ∗ gives the limiting value of these two
thresholds as the forest’s age increases without bound. Columns 5–7 report the values of forests
that are 0, 10, and 20 years old, respectively. These forest values are evaluated at P = 145, which is
approximately equal to the long-run timber price from our estimate of the timber price process (6).
Columns 8–9 decompose the value of a new forest into the value of the timber operations, FW , and
of the carbon credit cash flows, FQ, again evaluated at P = 145.
having to pull seedlings from the ground because a sudden drop in timber prices has made land
conversion the optimal strategy. The risk of such events occurring can be reduced by waiting past
the break-even point, to a time where prices are so high (respectively, so low) that the decision
to replant (respectively, convert to an alternative land use) can be made with confidence. As we
now discuss, the allocation of carbon credits can significantly alter the trade-offs facing forest
owners when they make their harvest decisions.
To better understand the impact of carbon credits on the thresholds in Figure 1, we perform
comparative statics analysis by varying the carbon credit payment under each scheme. The
results are presented in Table 4. Under the lump sum scheme, more valuable credit allocations
lead to a downward shift in both thresholds (both P r and P a fall). That is, abandonment
becomes less likely, and replanting will occur sooner (even than without carbon credits). The
reduced likelihood of abandonment is easily explained by the lump sum ‘tax’ which forest owners
must pay when they exit the industry. Further, by making replanting more attractive relative to
abandonment, allocating lump sum carbon credits lowers the value of waiting for more informa-
tion about the optimal future land use. This, in turn, leads to earlier harvesting when replanting
is optimal. Thus, while the disincentive to deforest will lead to greater carbon sequestration,
the shorter rotation length will have the opposite effect. (We will return to this issue in the
following section when we discuss the policy implications of the three allocation regimes.)
In contrast, under both the stocks and flows regime, increases in the value of carbon credit
payments shift the replanting threshold upwards and the abandonment threshold downwards, so
that rotations are longer when carbon credit payments are more valuable. The increased value of
the forest resulting from the carbon credit cash flows explains the lower abandonment threshold
and why, as in the lump sum case, the value of delaying the harvest decision is reduced. But now
this is more than offset by the fact that, under these two schemes, carbon credit cash flows are
generally larger later rather than earlier in the rotation, encouraging owners to delay harvesting
in order to preserve these high cash flows.
The forest yields value to the grower in two ways: cash flows from carbon credit allocations
and from saleable timber upon harvest. We can decompose the value of the forest into the
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corresponding components, F = FQ + FW , where FQ denotes the present value of the forest
attributable to carbon credit revenues and FW is the present value of future cash flows from
saleable timber. FW is easily calculated by valuing a hypothetical forest which does not receive
carbon credits, yet is managed according to the replanting and abandonment thresholds for a
forest which does receive carbon credits. Owners of this hypothetical forest only hold claims
to timber but behave in an identical manner to owners of the forest, who hold claims to both
timber and carbon credits. The two present value components of the forest under each carbon
credit scheme are reported in the final two columns of Table 4, which decompose the value of
a new forest into the value of the timber operations, FW , and of the carbon credit cash flows,
FQ, again evaluated at P = 145. This shows that the value of the saleable timber in the
forest is decreasing in x, illustrating that while carbon credit payments increase the value of a
newly-planted forest, they actually lead to sub-optimal wood production. The more valuable
the payments, the greater the distortion.10 Moreover, the degree of distortion differs across
the regimes. From Table 4, setting xf = 4.5 in the flows scheme results in future carbon credit
revenues with present value of $354.58, but raises the value of the forest by just $223.80; in effect,
forest owners receive just 63 cents in the dollar. For the stocks scheme with xs = 0.225, the
corresponding figures are $354.60 and $223.95, or 63 cents in the dollar; for the lump sum scheme
with xl = 1500, they are $1045.16 and $1006.10, or 96 cents in the dollar. The distortion caused
by carbon credit payments has implications for the allocation mechanism which governments
should choose. This and other policy implications are discussed in the next section.
6 Policy implications
In order to increase carbon sequestration, policymakers must encourage forest owners to lengthen
rotations, and discourage them from converting forest land to alternative uses. That is, poli-
cymakers desire a low abandonment threshold and a high replanting one, and trade these off
against the cost of carbon credits allocated to forest owners. Formally, we assume that the
policymaker maximizes U(FQ, P a, P r), where utility U is a decreasing function of FQ (defined
in the previous section and interpreted here as the present value of the cost of allocating credits
to growers) and P a (the maximum price required to induce forest owners to harvest and im-
mediately abandon), and an increasing function of P r (the minimum price required to induce
forest owners to harvest and immediately replant).11
The policymaker selects a carbon credit regime and chooses x. Forest owners then select
their optimal harvest and replanting responses, given the size of the payments, thus determining
FQ, P a, and P r. This maps out the set of all possible outcomes for the social planner, who will
then choose the regime and value of x that maximizes U(FQ, P a, P r). The bottom two curves
in Figure 2 plot the tradeoff between FQ and P a for each carbon credit scheme, while the top
two curves plot the corresponding trade-off between FQ and P r. The solid curves represent
the lump sum scheme, and the dotted curves the stocks scheme. The flows scheme gives curves
that are almost indistinguishable from the stocks scheme’s. Figure 2 shows that any lump sum
scheme is dominated by some stocks scheme — the stocks scheme with the same cost (that
is, the same value of FQ), induces less deforestation (that is, a lower value of P a), and longer
optimal rotations (that is, a higher value of P r).12
10This is consistent with the findings of Hartman (1976) and Berck (1980) that failure to include the non-market
and indirect financial benefits of a forest in the valuation problem may result in inefficient managerial decisions.
11We use the harvest thresholds for a 20-year old forest, and measure the cost FQ of carbon credit allocations
at P = 145 and t = 0. Our ranking of the three regimes is the same for a variety of different values of forest ages
and timber prices.
12One explanation for the poor performance of the lump sum scheme is our assumption that credits are allocated
at t = 0. Since the behavior of forest owners depends on the exit tax and not on the initial payment, and the
probability of abandonment is very low in the early years of the rotation, delaying the initial payment would have
little effect on P a and P r. However, such a delay would reduce the (present value of the) cost of the allocation,
and shift the corresponding curves in Figure 2 to the left.
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Figure 2: Trade-off faced by the policymaker
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Notes: The bottom two curves plot the tradeoff between FQ (the horizontal axis) and P a (the
vertical axis) for each carbon credit scheme, while the top two curves plot the corresponding trade-
off between FQ and P r. P a and P r, both evaluated at t = 20, are the maximum price at which
forestry is abandoned and minimum price at which the forest will be harvested and replanted,
respectively. FQ is the cost (in present value terms) to the government of making carbon credit
payments to forest owners. The solid curves represent the lump sum scheme, and the dotted curves
the stocks scheme. The flows scheme gives curves that are almost indistinguishable from the stocks
scheme’s. Since the policymaker’s objective function is decreasing in P a and increasing in P r, the
flows and stocks schemes are therefore preferred to the lump sum one.
A key consideration when assessing these schemes is the informational requirements for im-
plementation to occur. For instance, both the flows and stocks schemes require annual measures
of the carbon stock in order to be implemented. The cost of such frequent forest inventories could
quickly overwhelm the economic benefits of the credits themselves. In contrast, the need for only
one-off inventories under the lump sum regime is advantageous as it would significantly lower
monitoring and compliance costs. However, under Articles 3, 5, 7, and 8 of the Protocol, Annex
I Parties are required to maintain annual inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and
removals by sinks of greenhouse gases and report these in the annual National Communications
under the UNFCCC. Given these international reporting requirements, frequent stock-taking
may be unavoidable. The economies of scale associated with timing carbon credit payments to
coincide with these annual updates to the national inventories could yet make the flows and
stocks schemes feasible.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper has examined how three alternative schemes for allocating carbon credits affect the
harvesting and future investment decisions of forest owners. We found that the simplest scheme,
in which forest owners receive a lump sum payment whenever they plant a forest, and must repay
the same lump sum as soon as the forest is harvested, gives the owner a strong incentive not to
switch to an alternative land use. However, by making the outside option less attractive, this
lowers the value of delaying the harvest decision, and therefore leads to shorter rotations than
should be the case without carbon credits. Thus, while a lump sum scheme would discourage
deforestation, it would encourage more rapid rotations, implying an ambiguous result for overall
carbon sequestration.
The other two regimes we considered allocate carbon credits in proportion to the change in
the forest’s carbon stock, called the flows scheme, or to the level of the carbon stock, called the
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stocks scheme. Despite the differences between the flows and stocks schemes, we found that they
induce remarkably similar behavior from forest owners. The payment of carbon credits to forest
owners raises the value of using land for forestry, thus discouraging forest owners from exiting
the industry. However, unlike the lump sum scheme, replanting is delayed under these regimes.
This occurs because harvesting a forest would result in the relatively high carbon credit cash
flows earned by a mature forest being replaced by the much lower carbon credit cash flows earned
by a newly-planted one. Thus, the flows and stocks schemes both discourage deforestation and
encourage longer rotations, both leading to enhanced carbon sequestration.
In order to make the model tractable, we needed some simplifying assumptions. For exam-
ple, the only source of volatility in our model is fluctuations in the price of timber. A more
realistic model would allow for stochastic timber growth rates and, perhaps more importantly,
a stochastic price of carbon credits. While both features could be incorporated in a model of
the type used in this paper, they would significantly increase the complexity of the model and
make finding a numerical approximation to the forest value much more difficult.13
Finally, our model is a partial equilibrium one. If a carbon credit allocation regime is put in
place, the prices of timber and carbon credits are likely to be affected. For example, Sohngen
and Mendelsohn (2003) argue that timber prices will rise initially (as longer rotations reduce the
supply of timber), but will eventually fall (as more forests are planted). The difficult problem
of incorporating such behavior into a real options model is worthy of future research.
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Appendices
A Harvest and non-harvest related costs
Our model incorporates both harvest and non-harvest related costs. The values we use, based
on data provided by the New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, are reported in
Table 5.
B Numerical solution
In the absence of a closed-form solution to the option-pricing problem, we value the forest using
the explicit finite difference method. We use a series of grids, each representing a different
rotation, each with nodes labelled (Pi, tj), where Pi = i∆P and tj = (j − 1)∆t − T¯ . We
set ∆P = 5 and ∆t = 0.0025, and include 60 steps in the P -direction and 16401 steps in
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the t-direction.14 Harvest can only occur T = 1 year after the harvest decision is made. Let
F ki,j = F (Pi, tj ; k), which is the value of the forest at node (Pi, tj) in rotation k.
The finite difference equation corresponding to equation (5) can be written
F ki,j =
∆t
2
(
σ2i2 − (r − κ)i
)
F ki−1,j+1 +
(
1−∆t(σ2i2 + r)
)
F ki,j+1
+
∆t
2
(
σ2i2 + (r − κ)i
)
F ki+1,j+1 + ψj+1,
where ψj ≡ ψ(tj). Therefore the payoff from delaying the harvest decision at node (Pi, tj ; k) is
pid,ki,j =
∆t
2
(
σ2i2 − (r − κ)i
)
F ki−1,j+1 +
(
1−∆t(σ2i2 + r)
)
F ki,j+1 (B-1)
+
∆t
2
(
σ2i2 + (r − κ)i
)
F ki+1,j+1 + ψj+1.
Since, under the risk-neutral process for the timber price, Et[Pt+T ] = Pte
(r−κ)T , it follows
that the abandonment payoff in equation (3) can be rewritten as
pia = −δ +
∫ T
0
e−rsψ(t+ s)ds+ e−rT
(
(1− Tc)
(
Pe(r−κ)T − h
)
V (t+ T ) + Qˆ(t+ T ) + S
)
,
where t is the age of the forest, and P is the timber price, when the harvest decision is made.15
We approximate this payoff at node (Pi, tj ; k) by
pia,ki,j = −δ +
T¯ /∆t−1∑
n=0
e−rn∆tψi+n (B-2)
+ e−rT
(
(1− Tc)
(
Pie
(r−κ)T − h
)
V (tj + T ) +Q(tj + T ) + S
)
.
Similarly, the replanting payoff in equation (4) can be rewritten as
pir,k = −δ +
∫ T
0
e−rsψ(t+ s)ds
+ e−rT
(
(1− Tc)
(
Pe(r−κ)T − h
)
V (t+ T ) + Qˆ(t+ T )
)
+ F (P,−T¯ ; k + 1),
where k signifies the rotation of the forest which is being harvested, and F (P,−T¯ ; k + 1) is the
value of the next planted rotation when the harvest decision is made. It is approximated by
pir,ki,j = −δ +
T¯ /∆t−1∑
n=0
e−rn∆tψi+n (B-3)
+ e−rT
(
(1− Tc)
(
Pie
(r−κ)T − h
)
V (tj + T ) +Q(tj + T )
)
+ F k+1i,1 .
We suppose that the forest owner must abandon forestry after the fifth rotation.16 Thus,
when tj = 40 (so that further delay is not allowed), F
5
i,j = pi
a,5
i,j , where pi
a,k
i,j is given by equa-
tion (B-2). Once the terminal values of the forest in the final rotation are known, the value of the
forest may be calculated (for all possible prices and all earlier points in time) through backward
induction. In fact, when t is less than 40 years, delay or harvesting followed by abandoning is
possible, and the value of the forest is given by
F 5i,j = max{pi
d,5
i,j , pi
a,5
i,j },
14This grid specification forces the forest owner to make a harvest decision no later than 40 years, but we find
that optimal rotations are significantly less than this, so that the restriction does not affect our results.
15To simplify the analysis, we assume the abandonment decision is irreversible.
16Allowing more than five rotations had no significant impact on our numerical solution.
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where pid,ki,j is given by equation (B-1).
Similarly, the value of the forest in all prior rotations may be calculated. The only difference
is that now we allow the forest owner to replant after harvesting. Thus, when tj = 40 (and
further delay is not allowed), F it is given by
F ki,j = max{pi
r,k
i,j , pi
a,k
i,j },
where pir,ki,j is given by equation (B-3). For smaller tj , the value of the forest is given by
F ki,j = max{pi
d,k
i,j , pi
r,k
i,j , pi
a,k
i,j }.
14
